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Abstract: In the ‘Photosynthesis’ mechanism where tree leaves receive and prepare their food materials 
through sunlight. We may find it the same as in all Literature. While they receive their subjective 
food materials in the form of new literal ideas only through this everlasting Husserlian mechanism of 
‘epoché’ or, it’s “Photö-mechanism”— the kind dynamism of ‘epoché’— the “Photö-Dynamics (PD)”. 
In researching Edmund Husserl’s everlasting notion ‘epoché’ through Pheno→Photö→Word→Art 
concertment, one can re-discover so many new dimensional lights towards manifestation one of a new 
Phenomenology→Déconstruction→Déconcert dimension. ‘Déconcert’ from philosophical feature, 
may be explained as: “The theory of culturing syntagms by ‘photö-dynamics’ (PD), by concerting 
themselves with suitable literature(s), making and plying all at a time”. “Concerting Deconstruction” is 
only an effort towards exploration of the resultant-metaphysics of Derrida’s Philosophy of Déconstruction 
in the present era. Above all it’s an effort towards, the re-thinking of Husserl’s Phenomenology more 
scientifically after Derrida’s Deconstruction; and opening-up of new Déconcertic dimensions—. 
One of new kind dimension may be presented as “Photö-Phenomenology”; as a new branch of 
“Phenomenology” under Concertive Humanities. 
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DÉCONCERT: UNA FILOSOFÍA POST-DERRIDIANA
Resumen: Así como en la fotosíntesis las hojas reciben su alimento a través de la luz del sol; la literatura 
recibe su material alimenticio subjetivo en la forma de nuevas ideas literales a través del mecanismo 
husserliano de époche ó fotomecanismo. —Una clase dinamismo de époche—. En una relectura de 
Edmund Husserl la noción de époche atraviesa Pheno→Foto→Palabra donde se pueden redescubrir 
nuevas dimensiones mediante la menisfestación de una nueva dimensión: Fenomenología→ 
Decostrucción→Déconcert, desde lo filosófico, podría explicarse como: "La teoría de sintagmas 
culturales por fotodinámicas al ser en sí misma literatura, hacer y actuar todo al mismo tiempo". 
Deconstrucción concertada es sólo un esfuerzo hacia la exploración de la metafísica resultante de la 
filosofía de la Deconstrucción derridiana en la era actual.  Más allá de todo eso trata de un esfuerzo 
por repensar la fenomenología de Husserl con mayor cientificidad después de la Deconstrucción 
de Derrida hacia la apertura de nuevas dimensiones Deconcéntricas. Una de esa nueva clase de 
dimensión puede denominarse Fotofenomenología como una rama de la fenomenología en la escuela 
de Humanidades Concertivas.
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DÉCONCERT: A POST-DERRIDIAN PHILOSOPHY
IT’S A “CONCERT-O-DÉCONCERT”
The notion of Edmund Husserl’s ‘epoché’, as an exploration of new degrees of 
freedom in experience, is a very rich one. Husserl says, my ‘Epoché’ is nothing 
but a ‘sedimented’ or, ‘reflected’ part/portion of a ‘Phenomenological Reduction’. 
And it (epoché) is - “The reflected soul (Photö) of the external world through 
human consciousness”. After the reflection from ‘epoché’, there are results ‘photö 
consciousness’, which in turn becomes a “humanized essence of the external 
presence”, through a series of ‘photö- reflections’. As in the case of ‘Photosynthesis’ 
the tree leaves receive sunlight from the sun and then it is synthesized, in this 
way in ‘Photösyntagmatics’, the ‘Tabula rasa’ (Lock’s concept), receives conscious 
light from ‘Epoché’ or ‘Photo’, and then it (‘Photösyntagmatics’) results as in a 
meaningful literal structure. 
‘Photosynthesis’ is the mechanism in which tree leaves receive and prepare their 
food materials through sunlight and we may find the same in Literature, which 
receive its subjective food materials in the form of new literal ideas only through 
this everlasting Husserlian mechanism of ‘epoché’ or “Photö-mechanism”— the 
kind of dynamism of ‘epoché’ — the “Photö Dynamics”.  Thus,  ‘Déconcert’ in a 
philosophical way, may be explained as: “ The theory of culturing syntagms by 
‘photö-dynamics’ (PD), by concerting themselves with suitable literature(s), 
making and plying all at the same time” (Roy, 2010a). 
The theory of the syntagm casts a new light upon the role of ‘epoché’ towards 
concert-ment of photö-reflections. ‘Photösyntagm’ is the theoretical or literal 
presentation of ‘photöconscious ideas’; ‘photöconscious image(s)’ in the 
human mind which results after the reflection from ‘Epoché’ or ‘Photö’. And 
‘Photösyntagmatics’ is the method of translating the photöconscious ideas into 
meaningful literal structures with the help of the respective syntagm, (according 
to me).  Syntagmatic analysis can be applied not only to verbal texts but also 
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to audio-visual. In film and television, a syntagmatic analysis would involve an 
analysis of each frame, shot, scene or sequence related to the others (these are the 
standard levels of analysis in film theory). At the lowest level is the individual frame. 
Beyond the fourfold distinction between frames, shots, scenes and sequences, 
the interpretative framework of film theorists differ considerably. In this sense at 
least, there is no cinematic ‘language’ but may have a newly approached ‘Photö-
syntagmatics’. And Derrida’s effort towards deconstructing the formation of 
Language in respect to Pheno or Photösyntagm may lead towards deconcert-ing 
its Linguistic formation, as it appears. Thus ‘Déconcert’ for me, may be explained 
as: a Philosophical Method for evaluating pheno-reflective-concerts, resulting 
from ‘Concert’-ment of two (2) or more photö-syntagms, all at the same time. 
And “Concert-ing Déconstruction” is only an effort towards exploration of the 
resultant-metaphysics of presence of Derrida’s Déconstructive Philosophy or the 
Philosophy of Déconstruction in the present era. 
INTRODUCTION
Syntagmatic relations are the relations holding across the horizontal sequence 
of words uttered one after another. It’s by relation between words that language 
can sustain itself since words have no positive substance of their own. But 
Ferdinand de Saussure, a French Linguist, proclaims the equal importance 
for both types of relation and why his orientation is entirely towards the 
paradigmatic relations of words-sentence-to-language. Jacques Derrida is the 
poststructuralist who undertakes the challenge of articulating the metaphysical 
implications of structuralism. Structuralism, as narrowly defined, never rendered 
explicit the metaphysical framework upon which it relied. While deconstruction 
inherits from structuralism a holistic approach to language, it twists around its 
commitment to the ‘principle of imminence’; namely, the belief in functioning 
‘linguistic states’ as the necessary condition for the existence of a structured 
and intelligible totality. Derrida’s kind of holism is transcendental insofar as its 
conception of a structured totality does not depend on functioning states but 
rather is the sufficient condition for the very idea of totality. At the level of 
two different justifications of what a structure is and does for a language. In 
line with its commitment to an imminent kind of holism, structuralism defends 
an externalist justification, where externalism to indicate, in barren terms, that 
meaning depends on factors external to the mind. By contrast, in line with his 
own version of transcendental holism, Derrida deconstructs the externalism 
characterizing the structuralist understanding of structure, for the first time 
exposing the concept of structure in its ontological implications. 
Language requires a double level moving from old meaning to new meaning, 
creating what we don’t know out of what we do. This movement is precisely the 
movement of synthesis and projection, carrying us from the meanings of a single 
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word to the meaning of the projected syntagm. ‘Photösyntagm’ is the theoretical 
or literal presentation of ‘photöconscious ideas’, which results after reflection from 
‘Epoché’ (Husserlian concept) or ‘Photö’ (to me); and ‘Photö-syntagmatics’ is the 
method of translating ‘photöconscious ideas’ into meaningful literal structures with 
the help of respective photösyntagm: as it appears. And Derrida’s effort towards 
deconstructing the formation of Language in respect to Photösyntagm may lead 
one towards Deconcert-ing its Linguistic formation by concerting its syntagmatic 
structures. Thus the term ‘Déconcert’ according to me, may be explained as: a 
Philosophical Method for evaluating pheno-reflective-concerts, resulting from 
‘concert’-ment of two (2) or more photö-syntagms, all at the same time.
1. IDEA-L CONCERTMENT
To Concert Derrida’s Idea-l Deconstruction towards a fine concertment, it needs 
to get a very good help from his everlasting lectures & literatures on Husserl. The 
one way to understand the “idea” of Deconstruction is to see it in relation to 
the critique of philosophical foundationalism. Derrida sees the history of Western 
philosophy as a continuous attempt to locate a fundamental ground, a fixed center, 
and Archimedean point, which serves both as an absolute beginning and as a 
center from which everything originating from it can be, mastered and controlled. 
But as one tries to pin down the set of structuralist assumptions responsible for such 
an effect the picture becomes quite confused; particularly because, whenever put 
under philosophical pressure, the historical classification of structuralism tends to 
give way to that of post structuralism. From the mid to the late 60’s, Jacques 
Derrida is the poststructuralist who undertakes the challenge of articulating the 
metaphysical implications of structuralism. Structuralism, as narrowly defined, 
never rendered explicit the metaphysical framework upon which it relies; Derrida’s 
work on structuralism is one of unfolding what is implicated, or folding together. 
Derrida’s relation to structuralism cannot be properly explained in terms of either 
continuity or discontinuity, inside or outside, at most Derrida scholars as well as 
structuralist critics attempt to do. While deconstruction inherits from structuralism 
a holistic approach to language, it twists around its commitment to the ‘principle 
of imminence’; namely, the belief in functioning ‘linguistic states’ as the necessary 
condition for the existence of a structured and intelligible totality. Derrida’s kind 
of holism is transcendental insofar as its conception of a structured totality does 
not depend on functioning states but rather is the sufficient condition for the very 
idea of totality. At the level of two different justifications of what a structure is 
and does for a language. In line with its commitment to an immanent kind of 
holism, structuralism defends an externalist justification, where externalism to 
indicate, in laymans terms, that meaning depends on factors external to the mind. 
For structuralism, crucial amongst such factors is social usage. The structuralists 
call structure the explanatory model for the relations binding together a specific 
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set of existing linguistic states, such as those constituting a natural language or 
culture. Structure is therefore descriptive of an occurrence which is external 
to the individual mind. This externalist element is indispensible for the kind of 
comparativist strategy at the heart of the structuralist method, particularly in the 
versions expressed by Derrida’s two main interlocutors: Saussure and Claude 
Lévy-Strauss. By contrast, in line with his own version of transcendental holism, 
Derrida deconstructs the externalism characterizing the structuralist understanding 
of structure, for the first time exposing the concept of structure in its ontological 
implications. In doing so, Derrida shifts from the pragmatic plane, where structure 
is the explanatory model for an already existing set of relations, to a plane which 
is genealogical; because, in it, structure is defined in terms of its conditions of 
historical emergence in Western thought. Friedrich Nietzsche was the first to name 
this type of condition as ‘genealogical’. To Derrida, structuralism’s justification of 
structure-externalistic seems to be a genealogical justification. (Having reasons 
for being happy about certain of John Austin’s major contributions to philosophy 
and being also rather happy on the whole with Jacques Derrida’s contributions). 
Derrida’s study of Austin occurs in a paper given at Montreal in a symposium 
on “Communication”. Derrida considers himself obliged to begin by resisting a 
certain temptation which represents a proclivity of contemporary common sense. 
A tremor, a shock, can be physically “communicated” from place to place, and 
one can also say that in underground labyrinths one cavern “communicates” with 
another by means of a passage or opening. The temptation to say that the literal 
meaning of “communicate” is found in such physical applications of the word, 
while the application of the term “communication” to meaningful human speech 
is a metaphor derived from primary and literal physical applications. Derrida has 
two interesting reasons for not thus distinguishing between the “literal” and the 
“metaphoric” meaningful concertment of the word “communication”:
First, because the whole notion of distinguishing the true, literal, meaning of a word 
from its metaphoric meanings is nowadays problematic. If this first reason is valid, 
it levels not just this proposed conceptual hierarchy, through which the “primary” 
physical significance of “communicate” is ascribed a higher rank (as, perhaps, 
“hard data”) than the merely metaphorical significance of the same word. It levels 
every conceptual hierarchy which depends on a literal/metaphorical distinction. 
In particular, the distinction St. Thomas encountered and worked with, between 
the literal spiritual truth (the baptism) and the physical image (the water) is leveled. 
And in particular Ayer’s distinction between sentences with literal meaning (those 
which refer to sense-contents, directly or indirectly), and nonsense (all other 
sentences except tautologies) is leveled.
The second reason  Derrida gives for not construing its application to physical 
objects as the “literal” meaning of “communicate”, and its semiotic use as the 
“metaphoric” meaning of “communicate”, is that the very idea of “metaphor” 
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already presupposes a notion of “displacement”, or “transport”. “Displacement” 
is the more general notion, which is constitutive for the idea that a tremor “is 
communicated” when motion is displaced from one place to another; and also 
constitutive for the idea that the meaning of the word “communicate” has been 
displaced from its allegedly literal application to the communication of tremors 
from the epicenters of earthquakes, to its allegedly metaphorical application to the 
communication of ideas from mind to mind. 
Hence according to Derrida what we really need is not a decision about which 
sense of a word is to be regarded as the literal one, but rather an account of 
how “sense” begins in the first place through “displacement”, and through that 
which is indexed by other terms which Derrida presses into service in order 
to characterize the primary process through which meaning gets started: 
“mark”, “trace”, “the structure of locution”, “spacing”, “difference”, “ecriture”, 
“the graphematic in general”, “iterability”. Derrida introduces the neologism 
“iterable” as a synonym for “repeatable”.  A few lines later “iterable” serves as 
a synonym for “readable”. A writing that is not structurally readable - iterable - 
beyond the death of the addressee would not be a writing. At the same place 
Derrida suggests that the Latin root iter probably is derived from the Sanskrit 
itara, which means “other”. Then, in a remarkable precis of the complex and 
subtle remarks on “communication” which contain his critique of Austin, Derrida 
writes as – “everything that follows can be read as the working out of the logic 
that ties repetition to alterity”. And I think that as – “finally leading towards a 
better Letter-Language concertment”. 
2. LITERAL CONCERTMENT  
Similar to the mechanism of going through Pheno to Photö to Word (i.e. literal) 
concertment, I had received light from Husserl’s everlasting invention ‘epoché’. 
As like in the case of ‘Photosynthesis’ mechanism, where the tree leaves receive 
their food through sunlight; all Literature receives their subjective food materials 
in the form of new literal ideas, through this everlasting Husserlian mechanism 
of ‘epoché’. 
In regard to ‘language’, what Derrida has worked out as consequences of 
iterability, is all good from the point of view of those of us who want to work 
with a nature/culture distinction, and to reconstruct culture (as Gramsci says) 
in order to adjust it to physical functions.  The transformation of the global 
economy into a humane and sustainable mosaic of ways of life can only benefit 
from realizing that even the “ordinary” and “serious” language-games have a 
ritual character, and from realizing that even such categories as “intention” and 
“person” are socially constructed and can be reconstructed. A consequence 
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of Derrida’s deconstruction of Austin is that speech acts depend even more 
radically on socially constructed contexts than Austin supposed, or at least 
more radically than Austin worked out and demonstrated. Derrida’s work is 
consciousness-raising, in Freire’s sense, because it pushes back the perceived 
boundary between nature and culture, diminishing the realm of what is taken 
to be natural, and augmenting the realm of that which depends for its existence 
on human symbolic interaction. It implies that those of us who deliberately set 
out to reconstruct social reality have more scope; and it implies the same for 
everyone else too, since everyone is always recreating and being recreated by 
social reality, guided or misguided by varying degrees and kinds of deliberation. 
After Derrida, more is action; less is inevitable. Austin showed that to speak is 
in many ways a performance; it depends on conventions as does acting on a 
stage. Derrida breaks down the distinction between the “real” performance and 
the “stage” performance, and helps us to see that in all our performances we 
participate in social processes which construct the stage we act on, assign us our 
parts, and write the script. Many philosophers in history, from Plato onwards, 
have favored speech over writing. 
Writing, it has been assumed, represents speech (although often imperfectly) 
and is subsequently further away from thought, which is the primary locus 
of meaning. Writing is often viewed as something that is parasitic upon, or 
supplemental to, speech. Whereas speech involves one or more subjects, the 
reading of writing is characterised by the absence of a subject. As it is closer to 
thought, speech is better able to express meaning than writing. Writing is not 
viewed as an essential or reliable means for the production and transmission 
of meaning. Derrida questions these “phonocentric” sets of assumptions and 
argues that writing has a more important role in the production of meaning than 
the western philosophical tradition has acknowledged. To Derrida, writing is at 
least as important as speech with regards to the production of meaning and in 
fact writing is viewed as a necessary precondition for speech itself. Derrida’s 
deconstructive readings of thinkers such as Plato and Rousseau have shown 
that these thinkers actually require a concept of writing in the first place in 
order to get their “pro-speech” views articulated. More recently, philosophers 
such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Ludwig Wittgenstein (in his later works at 
least) have offered theories of meaning that differ significantly from Locke’s 
and Ayer’s. Developing a structuralist theory, de Saussure argued that language 
could be viewed as a closed system, in which individual words within narratives 
or texts only had meaning in relation to other words (through opposition and 
combination). De Saussure argued that it was difference and not reference that 
secured the meaning of a word. To Wittgenstein, meaning was essentially “inter-
subjective” and social in nature. Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of a word 
could only be found by its use within a social practice or “language game”. 
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3. THE CONTRAST
In contrast to the horizontal sequence of words uttered one after another, this 
dependence is as if vertical: the absent words are coeval and simultaneous with 
the present word. What’s more, these unuttered words are also unthought, at least 
in the mind of the individual language-user. The dependence of a present word 
upon absent words is also the dependence of parole upon langue; and langue is a 
total social system of differentiations, existing before the individual language-user 
and outside of the language-user’s consciousness. Admittedly, Saussure sometimes 
lapses into a more psychologistic vein, as when he talks of bringing forth absent 
words by principles of mental association. But the overall thrust of his ideas points 
elsewhere, and subsequent linguists in the Structuralist tradition have discarded 
all such talk. The kind of vertical dependence to which Saussure draws attention 
is ultimately logical, not psychological.
4. WORD-LANGUAGE: SYNTAGMATIC RELATIONS
Syntagmatic relations are the relations holding across the horizontal sequence of 
words uttered one after another. In the sentence ‘If the weather is fine, we will 
go out’, it is obvious that ‘the’ relates in some way to ‘weather’, ‘weather’ to ‘is’, 
and ‘is’ to ‘fine’. It is also obvious that these relations are actually thought and 
present in the minds of the utterer and receiver(s). In fact, syntagmatic relations are 
radically different to paradigmatic relations -not merely as two distinct dimensions 
of relating, but as two distinct types of relation. Saussure himself recognizes as 
much when he remarks that they ‘correspond to two forms of our mental activity, 
both indispensable to the life of language’. But in spite of this recognition, Saussure 
still tries to bring syntagmatic relations in under the same conceptual framework 
as paradigmatic relations. ‘In the syntagm’, he argues, a term acquires its value 
only because it stands in opposition to everything that precedes or follows it, or to 
both. But what is the opposition between ‘the’ and ‘weather’, between ‘weather’ 
and ‘is’, between ‘is’ and ‘fine’? Such terms are simply different, with no common 
scale between them. But the nature of syntagmatic relations will never appear to 
eyes that are looking to perceive likenesses and contrasts. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that Saussure never gets around to demon-strating exactly how oppositions 
work within the syntagm. In fact, his way of dealing with syntagmatic relations is 
a way of getting rid of them -or rather, two ways of getting rid of them. On the 
one hand, he relegates them to parole; stringing words together in sentences is 
viewed as a particular, occasional and unpredictable affair. The sentence, he says, 
‘belongs to speaking, not to language’; and ‘speaking is characterized by freedom 
of combinations’. That is, the choice of what to string together is determined 
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not by language but by personal and psychological factors. Saussure even seems 
to imply that the sequence of words is merely the sequence of concepts arising 
in the utterer’s mind. As elsewhere, he shows a curious blindness towards the 
kinds of necessity governing words as parts of speech. By insisting that langue 
and not parole is the proper province of linguistic study, he effectively banishes 
consideration of syntagmatic relations in ordinary sentences. On the other hand, 
he is prepared to consider a special type of syntagm which does have its place 
in langue. This is the special type of syntagm where habitual sequences of words 
have solidified into single blocks. These single blocks are virtually equivalent to 
single words, and, like single words, can enter into paradigmatic relations with all 
the other semantic units in langue.
5. GRAMMATICAL EFFORT
Writing, as Jacques Derrida conceives it, it represents an ideal form of 
word-sentence-language structure. When Derrida considers language 
unsyntagmatically, he reduces words to a condition of ultimate isolation. When 
he lets meaning spread out around a word like supplement or hymen, his 
meditation is a kin to the kind of meditation which might be inspired by the 
word ‘Eternity’ painted up on a rock, a single word in the middle of nowhere. 
But such a condition is abnormal and leads to an abnormal form of signifying. To 
deprive a word of all contexts is to deprive it of the environment that it needs to 
survive. There are two obvious kinds of context: the context of other words, and 
the context of a shared situation and interactive behaviour. When the context of 
a shared situation and interactive behaviour is very strong, as when a particular 
speaker addresses a particular hearer face to face, then single words may unify 
normally without any help from other words. On the other hand, when the 
context of other words is very strong, as when someone reads a book by an 
unknown author, then words together may signify normally without any help on 
behavioural cues or shared situation in the world. It is possible to give priority 
to the context of a shared situation and interactive behaviour, as functional 
Linguists and Speech-Act philosophers have done. There are good reasons for 
giving priority to the purely verbal kind of context in a philosophy of language. 
The danger of beginning with the non-verbal kind of context is that situation 
and behaviour seem fairly easy and plain -indeed, those who have taken this 
approach have generally spent more time on description than explanation. 
But in this case, the special powers of language tend to slip out of sight, and 
linguistic communication appears as mere incremental outgrowth of other, more 
basic forms of communication. Biologically, the frontal lobes are an incremental 
outgrowth of the more basic arts of the brain -but what an outgrowth!) If we 
want to recognize the special powers of language, then we must look to the 
way in which words can communicate even in the absence of their utterer. It is 
enough to have shown how a deeply grammatical category is involved in such 
Déconcert: a post-derridian philosophy          21 
meaning, involved in the very slice and conceptual cut of such meaning. For 
now it becomes possible to see how the unstable and precarious meanings of 
single words are redeemed when words come together syntagmatically. There 
is a parallel to this when meanings under different grammatical categories are 
squeezed together.
6. ‘PHOTO-SYNTAGMATICS’: THE ESTABLISHMENT
The notion of an epoché, as an exploration of new degrees of freedom in experience, 
is a very rich one. Edmund Husserl, a German Philosopher says, my ‘Epoché’ is 
nothing but a ‘sedimented’ or, ‘reflected’ part/portion of a ‘Phenomenological 
Reduction’. And it (epoché) to me is - “The reflected soul (Photö) of the external 
world through human consciousness” ; and  after reflection from ‘epoché’, there 
results ‘photö consciousness’, which in turn becomes a “humanized essence of 
the external presence”, through a series of ‘photö reflections’.
The theory of the syntagm casts a whole new light upon the role of parole. 
Saussure’s focus is all upon langue, upon the socially shared system that underlies 
particular utterances. On Saussure’s view, particular utterances are little more than 
the droppings of langue -as though speaking a sentence were merely a matter 
of selecting a small number of verbal items out of a very large catalogue. The 
social and conventional side of language dominates until it becomes difficult to 
see how one person can ever communicate something that another person does 
not already share. Parole has the power of the syntagm. This power appears most 
strikingly in exceptional syntagmatic combinations. In the case of an ordinary 
combination like ‘big dog’, the power of the syntagm cuts down upon the normal 
range of meaning socially instituted for the word ‘dog’ in langue. But in the case 
of ‘billion-ton pebble’, the power of the syntagm actually pushes ‘pebble’ out 
beyond the normal range of its meaning altogether. And ‘Photösyntagm’ is the 
theoretical or literal presentation of ‘photöconscious ideas’ of ‘photoconscious 
image(s)’ in ‘Mind’ which results after reflection from ‘Epoché’ or ‘Photö’; and 
‘Photösyntagmatics’ is the method of translating ‘photöconscious ideas’ into 
meaningful literal structures with the help of respective photösyntagm. 
As in the case of ‘Photosynthesis’ the tree leaves receive sunlight from the sun and then 
it is synthesized, in this way in ‘Photosyntagmatics’ the ‘Tabula rasa’ (Lock’s concept) 
receives conscious light from ‘Epoché’ or ‘Photo’, and then ‘Photosyntagmatics’ 
results as a meaningful literal structure.
On the other hand from a functional point of view: “Photosyntagmatics is the 
educational mechanism by which all literatures prepare / generate / translate 
the photoconscious ideas into meaningful literal structures with the help of 
respective existing syntagms, towards manifestation of new word→sentences for 
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the subjective growth of existing & new literatures. The Principal Literature with 
which the subject concerned deals, functions as The Sun and Syntagms function 
as Chlorophils here in this synthesism.”  The first subject mentioned here is the 
subject(s) as: Philosophy, Phenomenology, Concertölogy, etc. and the second 
subject mentioned is the subject concerned whom the synthesism deals with. 
A post-modern approach:  In re-searching Edmund Husserl’s everlasting notion 
‘epoché’ through Pheno→Photö→Word concertment, one can re-discover so 
many new dimensional lights towards manifestation of a new Phenomenology→D
éconstruction→Déconcert dimension.  ‘Photosynthesis’ is the mechanism in which 
tree leaves receive and prepare their food materials through sunlight and we may 
find the same in Literature, which receive its subjective food materials in the form of 
new literal ideas only through this everlasting Husserlian mechanism of ‘epoché’ or 
“Photö-mechanism”— the kind of dynamism of ‘epoché’ — the “Photö Dynamics”. 
Thus, ‘Déconcert’ in a philosophical way, may be explained as: “The theory of 
culturing syntagms by ‘photö-dynamics’ (PD), by concerting themselves with suitable 
literature(s), making and plying all at the same time” (Roy, 2010a).
Modern science defines “Photö-Dynamics” as: “The science that deals with the 
activating effects of light on living organisms.” And modern philosophy may define 
“Photö-Dynamics” as: “The philo-scientific device that deals with the activating 
effects of photö-light (i.e. epoché-al light) on human consciousness, towards the 
manifestation of new photös of consciousness’ under consideration.” 
“As consciousness always is consciousness of ‘photö’ of the world; and the world 
is not only the correlation of consciousness but that without which there would 
be no consciousness (Roy, 2010b). Consequently, for existential phenomenology, 
the modalities of conscious experience are also the ways one is in the world. This 
shift of the notion of the Lebenswelt (lived-world) to the emphasis upon being-
in-the-world expanded phenomenology in a way that allowed it to consider the 
totality of human relationships in the world in terms of the individual’s concrete 
existence. The very terminology itself, being-in-the-world, is existentialism’s 
attempt to avoid reference to human reality in terms either of a thinking substance 
or a perceiving subject closed in upon itself facing physical objects which may or 
may not be knowable. “Being-in-the-world” as “photöconscious existence” and 
“human language” as “photösyntagmatic existence” (Roy, 2010b) refers exclusively 
to human reality in contrast to non-human reality, and although the specific 
terminology has varied among existentialists, common to all is the insistence that 
human reality is situated in a concrete world-context.
In this way “Concerting Déconstruction” (Roy, 2010b) was an effort towards 
exploration of the resultant-metaphysics of Derrida’s Philosophy of Déconstruction 
by “Photö-Dynamics” for the present scientific era. Above all it’s an effort towards 
re-thinking of Husserl’s Phenomenology more scientifically after Derrida’s 
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Déconstruction; and opening-up of new Déconcertic dimensions for future 
research scholars, academicians and above all philosophers, for further onward-
concentrated concepts work on the same. With this view, “Photö-Phenomenology” 
has been introduced as a new branch of “Phenomenology” under the new 
School: Concertive Humanities; for a further, more re-searchable study of the 21st 
century’s wisdom of photö-phenomenological Déconcertö Philosophy: The newly 
emerged “Concertölogy” after “Phenomenology”. And thus, “Concertölogy” has 
been launched as a new branch of “Philosophy”, after “Phenomenology”. And 
simply is “Philosophy by Photö-Dynamics” (Roy, 2010a).
The term “Concertölogy” in “Philosophy” is derived from the root words: 
“Concert’-‘ö’-‘logos”, meaning in combination stands: “Doctrine of concert-ing 
photö concepts, deviced by Photö-Dynamics (PD)”. And thus it simply “Philosophy 
by Photö-Dynamics” (PD). “Where Phenomenology is the study of pheno-
concepts Concertölogy, is the study of photö-concepts; i.e. the concepts arrived 
after pheno-reflection(s) from ‘epoché’.” And “While “Phenomenology” deals with 
“Phenomena”, “Concertölogy” on the other hand deals with both “Phenomena” & 
“Photö-Vita” (PV); and photövita-s are the idea-l pheno-drops of ‘epoché’. It (photö-
vita) is one kind of wisdomical medicine that helps to strengthen any philosophical 
literature towards formal development / establishment of its existential form (of 
ideas) from its phenomenal form, only through Pheno→Photö→Word→Art 
concertment by Photö-Dynamics” (PD).”  Photö-Vita energizes Literatures. In other 
words, Literatures are energezized by Photö-Vitas. More concentrated or synthetic 
photovitas, are the generators of more energetic literatures.
CONCLUSION
Syntagmatic analysis can be applied not only to verbal texts but also to audio-
visual ones. In film and television, a syntagmatic analysis would involve an analysis 
of how each frame, shot, scene or sequence related to the others (these are the 
standard levels of analysis in film theory). At the lowest level is the individual frame. 
Beyond the fourfold distinction between frames, shots, scenes and sequences, 
the interpretative frameworks of film theorists differ considerably. In this sense 
at least, there is no cinematic ‘language’ but may have a newly approached 
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‘Photö-syntagmatics’. And Derrida’s effort towards deconstructing the formation 
of Language in respect to Pheno or Photösyntagm may lead towards deconcert-ing 
its Linguistic formation, as it appears. 
And thus ‘Déconcert’ to me may be explained as: a Philosophical Method for 
evaluating pheno-reflective-concerts, resulting from ‘concert’-ment of two (2) or 
more photö-syntagms, all at the same time. Rather, it is the Theory of culturing 
syntagms by ‘photö-dynamics’ (PD), by concerting syntagm(s) with suitable 
literature(s), making new and plying all at the same time.
‘Deconstruction’ is an attempt to open a text (literary, philosophical, syntagmatic, 
pheno or photo-syntagmatic or otherwise) to several meanings and interpretations. 
Its method is usually to take binary oppositions within a text — inside and outside 
or subject and object or male and female, which he argues are culturally and 
historically defined, even reliant upon one another — and show that they are not 
as clear-cut or as stable as it would at first seem, that the two opposed concepts 
are fluid, then to use this ambiguity to show that the text’s meaning is fluid as well. 
This fluidity stands as a legacy of traditional (that is, Platonist) metaphysics founded 
on oppositions that seek to establish a stability of meaning through conceptual 
absolutes where one term, for example “good”, is elevated to a status that designates 
its opposite, in this case “evil”, as its perversion, lack or inferiority. However, these 
“violent hierarchies”, as Derrida termed it, are structurally unstable within the 
texts themselves, where the meaning strictly depends on this contradiction or 
antinomy. This is why Derrida insisted that deconstruction was never performed 
or executed but “took place” through “memory work”: in this way, the task of 
the “deconstructed” was to show where this oppositional or dialectical stability 
was ultimately subverted by the text’s internal logic. The result is to find often 
strikingly new interpretations of texts, to the point where Derrida’s supporters 
claim his work consists of meticulous readings that find philosophy anew. No 
“meaning” is stable: rather, the only thing that keeps the sense of unity within a 
text is what Derrida called the “metaphysics of presence”, where presence was 
granted the privilege of truth. Thus, ‘Déconcert’ from philosophical feature, may 
be explained as: the Theory of culturing syntagms by ‘photö-dynamics’ (PD), 
by concerting themselves with suitable literatures, making new and plying all 
at the same timeΦ
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